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Abstract
A moribund and debilitated patient arrives in an emergency department and is placed on life
support systems. Subsequently it is determined that she has a ‘living will’ proscribing
aggressive measures should her condition be judged ‘terminal’ by her physicians. But, as our
round table of authorities reveal, the concept of ‘terminal’ means different things to different
people. The patient’s surrogates are unable to agree on whether she would desire
continuation of mechanical ventilation if there was a real chance of improvement or if she
would want to have her living will enforced as soon it’s terms were revealed. The problem of
the potential ambiguity of a living will is explored.
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Introduction
The Case
An 88 year-old woman from a nursing home is admitted by
ambulance to the emergency department (ED) with respi-
ratory failure, and an elevated temperature. She has
shallow ventilations 50 times a minute and her SaO2 on a
100% rebreather mask is 80%. Old records are being
faxed from the nursing home. The emergency physician
intubates the patient and her ventilation parameters
improve . Subsequently, a chest X-ray (CXR) shows left
lower pneumonia and an elevated white blood cell count
(WBC). A large amount of secretions are suctioned out.
After some sedation, the patient is resting and ventilating
quietly. And her vital signs are stable. The patient carries a
convincing diagnosis of dementia. Her family says she was
competent when she signed a living will five years previ-
ously but has since progressed to the point where she is
bedridden, fed by staff, unable to discern place and time
but seems to brighten around her family. She has not
offered any meaningful verbal dialog for one year. When
she is questioned, she offers dysconjugate answers, or
looks out the window wistfully.Critical Care    Vol 4 No 6 Crippen et al
In the ED she is sedated for intubation and is non-verbal.
She grimaces to painful stimuli, does not open her eyes
spontaneously and does not follow simple commands. At
this point, the faxed records arrive and the first page is a
‘Living Will’ declaration, signed and notarized in 1995 by
the patient, in which she states the following:
“I xxxx being of sound mind, willfully and voluntarily
make this declaration to be followed if I become
incompetent. This declaration reflects my firm and
settled commitment to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment under the circumstances below. I direct my
physician to withhold or withdraw life support that
serves only to prolong the process of me dying if I
should be in a terminal condition or a state of per-
manent unconsciousness. I direct that treatment be
limited to measures to keep me comfortable and
relieve pain, including pain that might occur by
withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treat-
ment. In addition, if I am in the condition described
above, I feel especially strong about the following
forms of treatment: I do not want cardiac resuscita-
tion, blood or blood products, tube feeding or any
other form of hydration or nutrition, intubation
and/or mechanical respiration, dialysis, antibiotics,
any form of surgery or invasive diagnostic test. In
addition, I do not want to designate another person
as my surrogate to make medical treatment deci-
sions for me if I should become incompetent.”
Two blood relatives (daughters) arrive shortly
after, and both issue orders
First relative
“The living will is very clear. I want her extubated
immediately and made comfortable with morphine
until she dies.”
Second relative
“Wait a minute now. On admission to the ED, she
did meet the criteria for the living will and her
wishes should have been followed. Following intu-
bation and mechanical ventilation however, my
mother is very stable and no longer ‘terminally ill’.
There is no overriding reason why she cannot be
extubated in a day or two and go back to square
one. She now has the strong potential to improve
(on antibiotic and supportive care) that she did not
have before the living will was ignored. Intubation
changed all that. Mechanical ventilation is not pro-
longing death, it is bridging an unstable process so
that she may anticipate life. Therefore I say that the
living will is no longer relevant. The act of placing
my mother on life support supersedes the terms of
the living will and we are now in a mode to support
her if the odds are such that she has a better
chance of life than death.”
How do you handle this?
David Crippen
The issue here is that ‘terminality’ means different things to
different people at different times. There is a ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ reality to the expression ‘terminal’. The hard terminal
reality is that this patient is going to die without the ‘inva-
sive’ treatment she has pre-emptively proscribed because
she is in organ-system ‘failure’. Organ-system ‘dysfunc-
tion’ such as pneumonia, an elevated temperature and
WBC count are different; they are treatable disorders. So
if an otherwise healthy patient came to an ED with these
symptoms, one would simply treat it. The issue of terminal-
ity would never enter into it because the patient is well
compensated. However, our patient is different; she has
reached the end of her compensatory powers and so we
are not dealing with pneumonia, a temperature and WBC
elevation. We are dealing with decompensated organ
system failure and that is a very different situation.
A gradient sufficiently bad to cause an SaO2 of 80% on
100% rebreather mask, is ‘respiratory failure’. She is
unable to oxygenate because of some form of blockage
between oxygen carrying structures and the adnexal alveo-
lar capillary. Her pneumonia has clogged a sufficient
number of alveoli such that simply increasing the inspired
oxygen will not improve arterial oxygenation because it
cannot get from the bronchus to the capillary. So the
patient is already pushing venous blood (SaO2 of 80)
through her post-alveolar arteriole and there is no way to
increase the amount of oxygen available. She is already on
the maximum possible without mechanical ventilation
(100% rebreather). Increasing the FiO2 simply increases
the concentration of oxygen in the bronchus.
In addition, the patient is unable to ventilate because her
functional residual volume has decreased to the point
where the energy it takes to move her lungs is greater than
her musculoskeletal ability, due to Laplace’s law. There-
fore, she does not have the energy option to breath
deeply; only enough energy to breath rapidly and shal-
lowly, which will not adequately oxygenate her collapsed
and obstructed alveoli. A BiPAP mask will not fix this situa-
tion. It will not take over the work-to-breathe that mechani-
cal ventilation is designed for. Put the two together and
she is definitely ‘terminal’ because nothing will save her
other than invasively inflating her alveoli and taking over
the work to breathe. There is no effective ‘conservative’
treatment. There are only two ways to reverse this self ful-
filling prophesy of doom; positive pressure ventilation to
splint open the errant alveoli and force them to participate
in gas transfer, and mechanical ventilation to take the ulti-
mately fatal work-to-breathe away from the failing patient
and put it on an energetic machine.
This ‘hard’ definition of ‘terminal’ is a snapshot taken of a
finite point on a moving continuum of events. The patienthttp://ccforum.com/content/4/6/333
is interpreting ‘terminal’ as a unidimensional phenome-
non but it is, in the critical care domain, multi-dimen-
sional. Her condition is terminal only if not treated by
positive pressure mechanical ventilation, in which case it
is imminently curable. For whatever reason she does not
desire to take a chance that machines can reverse her
organ failure so she would rather die than succumb to
them. It doesn’t seem to us that she has clearly thought
the issue through. That is part of the problem with living
wills. It is impossible for me to know if the patient under-
stood all the implications of the living will when he or she
signed it or if they still subscribe to a previous interpreta-
tion of these implications when they arrive in my ICU
months or years later.
Therefore, when such a patient arrives and I read the
‘living will’ I am in a quandary. They have the autonomy to
tell me what they desire done with their body and I am
pretty much limited to their wishes no matter how ill-
advised they seem. So, if the living will had accompanied
this patient, I would have made her comfortable and let
nature take its course. So much for dealing with ‘terminal-
ity’ as a blip on a line. However, the continuum of events
has moved on and the definition of ‘terminality’ has moved
on with it. As Ms Whetstine says: “Just because she
would have died without treatment doesn’t make her ter-
minal, it makes her in need of an intervention.” After she
is intubated she is no longer terminal. She is imminently
curable and her previous wishes regarding ‘terminality’ do
not apply. So I must consider new options.
The ‘hard’ unidimensional reality has irrevocably pro-
gressed to a ‘soft’ multidimensionality. Her previous estima-
tion of appropriateness of survivability is now moot. She
did not want to take a chance on survival, but that isn’t the
way the cards fell. Now survivability is assured and remov-
ing her from life assuring machines isn’t the same thing as
not putting her on them initially because of her previous
wishes. It is a very different concept and so I get some lati-
tude in interpreting the new issue of survivability. Which is
the most proximate force, what she wished (and authorita-
tively told you she wished) or what you think she might
wish the second time around if her first wishes were
ignored? What is a ‘reasonable expectation’ of what she
might wish with the after-knowledge that she might
survive? We chose to maintain the patient on mechanical
ventilation because of new interpretations of survivability
available to us after the first wish became moot.
I also think that in the multidimensional universe of criti-
cal care, there is a difference between withholding and
withdrawing life-supporting technology. If a patient
arrives in moribund condition and there is a living will or
some other durable proof of the patient’s wishes, the
expectation is that death will occur as a result of those
wishes. It is the whole point. The patient presumably
understands that, and their considered desire is for
death to occur because any outcome of a resuscitation
is pre-emptively thought to be unpalatable. The
outcome is known before the game starts and the
patient does not desire to roll the dice because he or
she doesn’t want to play the game. I think it is easier for
patients and their families to make decisions about
withholding care because they perceive an associated
outcome that is easier to accept and which makes it
appear less that they are making a decision that is
‘killing’ the patient. If the perceived outcome is
inevitable death regardless of resuscitation, then what
is the big problem allowing that inevitable death to
happen earlier rather than later?
Once life-supporting care is instituted however, a much
clearer and impossible to ignore picture of the outcome is
immediately available for the perusal of all. The patient
now has options they didn’t have before for survival of a
sort, even if it is dependent of life support. Once this
occurs, choices must be made right under the nose of that
clear vision. Patients and their families are forced to look
at the reality that their decisions are inextricably linked to
an outcome that is no longer inevitably fatal. There are
now variables that they control, and it is much easier for
them to make the connection that their decision may
hasten death rather than avoid prolongation of it. Instead
of yielding to inevitable death, the potential now exists to
manipulate death, and a large number of families find that
very disturbing. That is why a large number of families
demand what we consider futile life support for patients
who clearly cannot benefit from it.
Leslie Whetstine
We may be able to tweak the definition of terminal and have
some latitude as to its imminence, but terminality is a one
way ticket. To claim that this patient was terminal one day
but is now playing checkers in her nursing home after a brief
stint on a ventilator is simply incongruous; it resonates as a
metaphorical resurrection. I will argue that she was never
terminal and the living will never entered the equation. Even
if it was available on her admission, a living will of the kind
described in this case was not technically in effect as per
her specific criterion of terminality, thus she should have
been resuscitated to the full extent of medical acumen.
The American public is already distrustful of the medical
establishment, so we must consider how they will react if
they think their doctors are so broad in their conception of
terminality that it becomes a day to day diagnostic game.
While living wills have an integral part in patient care, they
risk becoming meaningless, and often problematic, slips of
paper without the proper dialogue to undergird them. It is
detrimental to impose a unidmensional/multidimensional
spin on terminality as Dr. Crippen suggests. This type of
language will most assuredly confuse the average layperson and detract from candid communication, which is
the primary reason why living wills are not proving as
effective in practice as they are thought to be in theory.
The communication catalyst is not there.
I agree that this patient may have in all likelihood died
without an intervention, but that doesn’t make her ‘termi-
nal’ because that which is ‘terminal’ is incurable regard-
less of what treatments are available. Put another way,
death becomes her with or without intubation if in fact she
is ‘terminal’. That she will certainly die without it does not
absolutely mandate terminality, it renders her merely in
need of an intervention. She would be terminal if the
modality could not revitalize her. As a logical extension of
this fact, real people in real situations may find themselves
in need of a treatment without which they will die, but will
not earn them the status of terminality. We cannot make
the judgement of terminality by saying what will happen if
something is not done. We can only make the call of termi-
nality if death is in spite of available interventions.
For example, AIDS is currently thought of as a terminal
disease. But some specific interventions now exist that will
prolong the ‘inevitable’ death indefinitely. Therefore, we
can no longer say AIDS is a ‘terminal’ disease. It simply
requires a specific treatment without which one will die,
but with which life will be extended. The corollary holds
true with our case. The patient will die without a treatment
that in fact exists to cure her. If you withhold it, you have
committed and egregious ethical error. I am of the opinion
that a physician who would have withheld intubation in this
instance, as it had the ability to correct an acute situation,
would have literally killed this patient in a very legal sense.
That the patient proscribed intubation if she were ‘termi-
nal’ is the thorny issue for Dr Crippen. Although her living
will did refuse a specific intervention that would pre-emp-
tively save her life (intubation), it did not proscribe any
interventions that would potentially save her life. Presum-
ably she was trying to secure a fate that would not leave
her on machines indefinitely or while she was trying to die.
While I do not know that to be fact, I do know that her
living will states that she did not want intubation if she
were terminal, so whatever her motives I would abide by
her wishes, all other factors being equal. But the criterion
of ‘terminality’ as I have described it is not yet met and so
Dr. Crippen’s concern is irrelevant. Her living will did not
convey that she would rather die than ever be intubated,
she proscribed being on it if she were terminal; a process
independent of the treatments available. Again we must
ask ourselves how could she be irreversibly dying if all she
needed was to be intubated for a period of time and sub-
sequently returned to her baseline?
The other very large problem is the living will itself and
what it was drawn up to prevent, or to secure, for this
patient. Without designating a surrogate, and with merely
a sheet of paper to go by, problems such as this are
inevitable. The purpose of a living will is to facilitate com-
munication. We know she did not want invasive life
support if she were terminal (the definition again comes to
the forefront). However, the question to be considered
now is why this patient chose the rather vague language
she did and why nobody (her two daughters included)
really could say what she wanted.
We should not distribute living wills in a manner akin to a
census form to be completed. These are life and death con-
cerns and they should not be simply filed away on the chart
without some serious dialogue. The purpose again is com-
munication. The staff that helped her with her living will are
responsible for generating discussion and ensuring that the
patient understands all the implications of her decisions.
The reasons behind the patient’s wishes are important. It
does not matter if anyone agrees with her, but being privy to
her philosophy on life enables all involved in her care to
understand her values. In this regard we have a communica-
tive process and a person, rather than a pencil and a survey.
The rationality underlying the living will may be subtle, but
very important. Perhaps she did not clearly understand
what she meant when she agreed to refuse intubation, or,
as we’ve seen, perhaps she did not know that terminal
could mean different things to different people. Tailoring
her wishes, for example acceding to a trial run of intuba-
tion if she had a reasonable chance of recovery, may have
been something she would have considered (which could
have been included in her living will). Lay people however,
may not have insight into the mechanics of living wills or
life support systems. Perhaps they do not realize that they
can have total control in their care and that they can ask
for help, ask questions and be as specific as they want
when composing these documents.
It is not up to the public to know these things prospectively.
It has become standard operating procedure upon admis-
sion to some hospitals to ask patients if they have a living
will, and if not would they like to institute one, as casually
as if they asked whether the patient had cereal for break-
fast. It is a process which must be improved upon, and it is
our job as medical professionals accept the responsibility
to facilitate that process. People must be able to trust in
their health care providers and to feel comfortable enough
to solicit help from them when discussing such sensitive
issues. Communication and trust mark a healthy relation-
ship between patient and physician, I doubt people will be
apt to trust those who are willing to classify them as termi-
nal when they are merely in need of a routine intervention.
Mitchell M. Levy
I think this case is relatively straightforward. The patients’
advance directive specifies that life support be withheld or
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me dying, if I should be in a terminal condition or a state
of permanent unconsciousness.” Both respiratory failure
and dementia fail to meet either of these two criteria. The
patient does not appear to have any disease that could be
considered, by conventional definition to be ‘terminal’.
One could make the case that the patient will certainly die
if nothing is done, and therefore respiratory failure itself
meets the criteria for ‘terminal’. I do not think most clini-
cians or patients view the concept of ‘terminal’ in such a
narrow, immediate sense. For most of us, ‘terminal’ refers
to a patient with chronic, end-stage disease, who is close
to death and without a reasonable chance for reversal. I
do not think that the patient met the criteria for the living
will on admission to the ED. If terminal were to be inter-
preted in such a narrow sense, then any serious illness
could be seen as ‘terminal’, in which case the patient
would not have made her request for withholding or with-
drawal, conditional. In addition, even if there were a con-
sensus amongst the family, the patients’ advance directive
specifically prohibits surrogate medical decision-making.
One could argue that the patient, when competent, did
not want any member of her family to make medical deci-
sions for her. In this case, the clinician must continue life
support and begin a process of conflict resolution within
the family in an attempt to better understand who, if
anyone, understands the needs and wishes of the patient.
My recommendation would be that life support be contin-
ued and further investigation be pursued with the family,
primary care physician and nursing home staff.
Robert Truog
While I have great respect for the other commentators on
this case, I think their focus upon trying to define ‘terminal’
is misguided. It reminds me of the efforts a decade ago to
come up with a definition of “futile’; efforts that have
become paradigms of futility themselves. The solutions
here will inevitably be found in procedures, not definitions.
So, to begin with, it is helpful to recognize that advance
directives come in two flavors; living wills and durable
powers of attorney. Ideally, these two should be used
together. The purpose of a living will is to give families and
clinicians some idea about how a patient would like to be
treated under various clinical scenarios. In this case, the
patient indicated that if she was terminally ill or in a state
of permanent unconsciousness, she explicitly did not want
any of the life-sustaining treatments that she listed in the
document.
While neurologists have a pretty good handle on how to
diagnosis the permanent vegetative state (that is, perma-
nent unconsciousness), the definition of ‘terminally ill’ is
(and I believe will remain) hopelessly elusive. All of the def-
initions that might be proposed depend upon a number of
assumptions, and we have no way of knowing what
assumptions this patient might have accepted or refused.
This is why living wills should always be coupled with a
durable power of attorney. The surrogate decision-maker
appointed by the durable power of attorney is specifically
charged with the job of interpreting the patient’s living will,
and determining (within reasonable limits) whether the
patient’s current clinical situation meets the conditions
specified in the living will. Physiologic observations like
those of Dr. Crippen, while quite sophisticated and inter-
esting, miss the mark because he is not the one autho-
rized to interpret what the patient meant when she filled
out her living will.
In this case unfortunately, the patient specifically declined to
appoint a surrogate decision-maker. Furthermore, the two
most reasonable candidates for this role are relatives who
are in disagreement, and there is no way for the clinicians to
know which of the two relatives can most accurately repre-
sent the patient’s interests and desires. For these reasons, I
see no alternative but to ask the court to appoint a guardian
ad litem for this patient. The primary responsibility of the
guardian would be to fulfill the role of surrogate decision-
maker, that is, to interpret the patient’s living will and to
apply it to the patient’s current clinical situation.
If the guardian were to determine that, at the time of pre-
sentation, the patient would not have wanted to be intu-
bated and mechanically ventilated, then the fact that she
subsequently received those interventions and improved is
entirely irrelevant. Those who would argue otherwise make
a serious logical mistake. For a patient to rightfully refuse a
medical intervention, it is not necessary for that interven-
tion to be futile. Indeed, the strength of the patient’s
refusal arises explicitly from the fact that the intervention
may, in fact, be very effective at restoring the patient to a
baseline state of health. Nevertheless, the patient has
determined that the burdens associated with the interven-
tion exceed the value of this benefit.
In other words, the fact that this patient improved follow-
ing intubation and ventilation is neither clinically surprising
nor ethically relevant. The purpose of the living will is to
indicate the conditions under which the use of life-sustain-
ing treatments is judged to be more burdensome than
beneficial, even if these treatments may be effective. If a
court appointed guardian were to determine that she
would not have wanted to be intubated and ventilated at
the time of her presentation, then she should be immedi-
ately extubated and made comfortable. To do otherwise
would be to misunderstand the meaning and purpose of
living wills.
Conclusion
John Luce
In the United States and other technologically sophisti-
cated countries, patients are requesting like never before
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taining therapy. At the same time, physicians are increas-
ingly willing to honor such requests, especially when their
patients’ wishes seem well thought out. Living wills and
similar written instructions provide a means by which
patients can articulate what they want done in the event of
critical illness, whereas devices such as the durable
power of attorney for health care allow patients to desig-
nate surrogates to act on their behalf. Ideally, written
instructions are sufficiently detailed to cover a variety of
clinical circumstances, and the designation of surrogates
leaves no doubt as to whom will represent the patients’
interests. Furthermore, as Robert Truog stresses, both
kinds of advance directive should be used in concert so
that surrogates can call upon written instructions to
specify what patients would want done.
The case under discussion is an example of how not to
prepare an advance directive. It concerns an elderly
woman who has filled out a living will that sanctions with-
holding and withdrawal of life support only is she is “in a
terminal condition or a state of permanent unconscious-
ness” but includes no other medical situations. In addi-
tion, the patient has refused to name a surrogate “to
make treatment decisions for me if I shall become incom-
petent,” which she has become. When the patient devel-
ops respiratory failure due to a pneumonia that she might
survive, the emergency department physicians to whom
she is brought have no choice but to intubate and
mechanically ventilate her. These interventions are
required because the patient is not yet terminal or perma-
nently unconscious and because her two daughters,
neither one of whom is her official surrogate, disagree
about how their mother should be managed. Only if and
when the patient fails to respond to treatment can the
physicians who will care for her in the intensive care unit
recommend limiting life-sustaining therapy. As Dr. Truog
suggests, a court-appointed guardian must make the final
decision regarding withholding and withdrawal of life
support from the patient even if her daughters resolve
their differences, because she has specifically excluded
them from being her surrogates.
Clearly, physicians should discourage patients from
making advance directives of the sort made by this
woman. More important, physicians, particularly those who
serve in a primary care capacity, should encourage
patients to prepare directives that simultaneously detail
their wishes and designate surrogates to represent them.
Although advance directives may be made on hospital
admission, they should be prepared before critical illness
occurs if possible. Furthermore, as Leslie Whetstine
observes, the directives should stem from a patient-physi-
cian relationship founded on communication. Physicians
who have fully discussed the future with their patients are
in the best position to facilitate end-of-life care for them.
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